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Introduction
Dr. Snoeck Henkemans is reporting on part of a large and, in my opinion, an important research project. It has
to do with part of what I have called "argument management"1: the identification, interpretation, and evaluation of
arguments in use. Most textbooks that cover argument management hurry over the steps of identification and
interpretation in order to focus on evaluation. Teachers know, however, that the steps of identification and
interpretation are rushed in the classroom at everyone's peril. Still, we make do with crude and theoretically
under-funded tools. "Look for argument indicators," we advise; then in the next breath we add, "But keep in
mind that these are argument indicators only sometimes, not always." We know the difference (we believe), but
we are hard-pressed to explain it, for there has yet to be developed a theoretically-grounded or principle-based
account of how argument is linguistically marked by arguers and noted by their audiences. If I understand her
paper, it is the project of producing such an account that Dr. Snoeck Henkemans is working on, and part of
which she is reporting in this paper.
The scope of the overall project is broad: nothing less than a systematic, theory-grounded understanding of how
it is that we are able to distinguish argumentation from other forms of discourse. The scope of the part of that
large project that Dr. Snoeck Henkemans is reporting on today is more modest: some ways of distinguishing
argumentation from explanation. While this is small part of the overall task, it is a vexing one-well worth the close
attention she is giving it. First, it's disputed that there is a distinction here (Stephen Thomas, for example, seems
to deny it 2). Unquestionably there are cases where the distinction breaks down: the same text can be read as
either as an explanation or as an argument. Second, even those who insist on a distinction in principle must grant
that in actual texts it can be difficult to distinguish the two: the parsimony of language has the same words doing
double-duty by introducing both (for instance, 'because,' 'for, and 'since' and their synonyms in many other
languages). And third, if headway can be made in providing theory-grounded rules for distinguishing arguments
from explanations, presumably the results can be applied generally to distinguish arguments from other functions
of discourse.
As Dr. Snoeck Henkemans describes it, the project has three parts: (1) the inventory of potential argument
indicating words and expressions, (2) the classification of these indicators from the perspective of the pragma-
dialectical model for critical discussions, and (3) the description of the (felicity?) conditions for a verbal
expression's serving as an indicator of a specific argumentative move. In my comments, I will focus on her
proposals for (3), found in the second half of her paper in the section titled, "Verbal indicators of argumentative
and explanatory relations."
 
Critical Discussion
If I understand her correctly, Dr. Snoeck Henkemans is proposing two sets of conditions, to be used along with
the verbal indicators, to distinguish argument from explanation in a text. For reference, let me call these the
"propositional content" conditions for explanations and the "acceptability" conditions distinguishing arguments
from explanations.
Propositional content conditions for explanations:
1. The explanandum must be a factual state of affairs
2. The explanans must mention the cause of this state of affairs
Acceptability conditions distinguishing arguments from explanations:
1. for arguments: Argument is put forward when the speaker expects that the acceptability of the
standpoint is at issue.
2. for explanations: Explanation only if the explained statement has already been accepted by the
listener as depicting a true state of affairs.
It is clear that these conditions are at least rough-and-ready guidelines, but are they more than that? Are they
either necessary or sufficient? Let me deal with each set of conditions in turn.
I begin with the propositional content conditions for explanations:
First, can only factual states of affairs be the subjects of explanations? I don't think so. I take it as a given, for
example, that manipulating a weak person just to enjoy one's sense of power over them (in other words,
bullying) is wrong. But why that is so is not a given. What makes such conduct wrong? We seek an explanation
of the wrongness of bullying, but what we seek to explain is not a factual state of affairs. Another example: you
want to know how to conceptualize a computer program, that is, you want a model. You are seeking an
explanation, but again, a conceptualization of a computer program is not a state of affairs. If I am right about
examples like these, they are counter-examples to the claim that only states of affairs can be subject to
explanations.
Second, can there be non-causal explanations? Assuming that other things besides factual state of affairs can be
the subjects of explanations, then their explanations will be non-causal. The explanation of the wrongness of
bullying, for example, will not be provided by an account of what causes people to bully others (or, at least, such
an account alone will not suffice as an explanation of bullying). The explanation that a computer directory is like a
filing cabinet, that a sub-directory is like a drawer in the cabinet, and so on, does not constitute a causal account
of how the program works.
Third, must a causal explanation explain only the state of affairs in question? Often we know how some state of
affairs came about—we know what caused it—but we don't know what its effects will be. This question used to
be asked about television; now it is being asked about communication using computers. What does it portend?
We want someone to explain the significance of the phenomenon. Here the question is not about what caused the
state of affairs, but about what effects the state of affairs is having, or might have in the future.
If these three counter-examples stand up, then the thing being explained does not have to be a factual state of
affairs, and the explanation need not mention its cause. Hence, the propositional content conditions don't
distinguish explanations from arguments in every case.
I turn next to the acceptability conditions, starting with the acceptability condition for arguments.
First, is it necessary? Is an argument put forward only if the speaker expects that the acceptability of the
standpoint is at issue?
The answer is, no. For instance, arguments can be given to reinforce an already-accepted position. Examples are
to be found in political speeches addressed to the party faithful and in religious sermons addressed to devout
believers. Now, the following reply to this counter-example is available: a background condition of any such
arguments is that the party's position is at issue among the electorate at large and that the church's teachings are
challenged in the wider world, so it remains true that a condition of argument is that the arguer anticipates that the
standpoint's acceptability is indeed at issue. However, in that case, the condition needs to be made more precise,
for the examples do show that it is not a necessary condition of argument that the audience of the argument
questions the standpoint.
Another kind of counter-example consists of the arguments that are given to provide new insight into an already-
accepted position. We all agree that P, for good and sufficient reasons with which everyone is familiar. But there
is in another argument for P that puts it in an entirely different light. Suppose, for example, that you oppose
capital punishment because you believe it to be more expensive than the alternatives (given the costs of the
inevitable appeals), because you believe that sometimes innocent people are convicted of capital crimes and the
risk of executing the innocent is not worth any possible benefits, and because you believe that capital punishment
is not an effective deterrent to capital crimes. In short, you are opposed to capital punishment on consequentialist
grounds, not in principle. In that case, it would not be inappropriate for someone to try to persuade you that
capital punishment is also intrinsically wrong, and to use arguments to do so. So here is another type of situation
in which arguments may be appropriate even when the acceptability of the standpoint is not at issue.
I conclude that the acceptability condition for arguments is not necessary.
Is if sufficient? Obviously not. It is normal for people to resort to non-argumentative means of getting their way,
or of persuasion, when they expect that the acceptability of their standpoint is at issue.
Finally, consider the second acceptability condition for explanations:
Is it necessary? Do explanations occur only if the speaker believes that the listener has already accepted the
explanandum as true? No, explanations can be supplied when the listener does not accept the statement as
depicting a true state of affairs. We often supply explanations with a view to convincing people of standpoints
they don't accept. Example 1. Someone doubts that a cat can fit through such a narrow passage. You convince
him by explaining how cats can turn their heads, shoulders and hips sideways, thus taking up a fraction of their
"normal" width.3 Example 2. Someone doubts that she can operate a product so she doesn't want to buy it. The
salesperson explains how it works, demonstrating how a child can operate the product, and thereby convincing
the customer that she can operate it. These are cases of explanations used as arguments, or as parts of
arguments, but they are explanations offered to people who do not accept the explanandum as true. So, the
acceptability condition for explanations is not necessary.
Is it sufficient? Will a speaker always explain a statement that he believes the listener already accepts as true?
Only if he is a dreadfully pedantic bore.
 
Conclusion
Well, if all of this is true, what follows? I don't believe that Dr. Snoeck Henkemans thinks any of these conditions
is sufficient, but unless they are at least necessary, we do not yet have a tight theoretical account of the conditions
under which typical argument-indicting terms signal the presence of arguments. So the above comments do seem
to imply either that some refinements are needed, or else that claims to strict theoretical rigour will have to be
qualified. But none of the above contests the methodology, the general approach, that Dr. Snoeck Henkemans is
taking. And none of it implies, I hope, that the project is misconceived or unimportant, for I believe the opposite.
Notes
1. "Argument Management, Informal Logic and Critical Thinking," Inquiry, XV.4 (1996): 80-93.
2. Thomas distinguishes explanations from justifications, but holds that explanatory discourse should be classified
as argument no less than justificatory discourse. See his Practical Reasoning in Natural Language
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2nd ed., 1981), pp. 11-14.
3. A completely invented example: I have no idea whether it is true.
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